One observation that recurs when analysing the annual accounts of large global construction machinery manufacturers is the proportion of aftermarket in their revenue mix and, above all, its contribution to profit. New equipment pays for presence. Aftermarket pays for profitability. The medium-sized Spanish manufacturer, for the most part, operates with the inverse logic.
The useful life cycle of a construction machine (excavators, backhoes, loaders, dumpers, compaction equipment) frequently exceeds fifteen years, with scheduled maintenance interventions, replacement of worn components and repairs from intensive use. Each year in operation generates demand for original spare parts, technical service interventions, operator training and, in some cases, comprehensive equipment refurbishment.
That demand is stable, predictable and, for the most part, capturable by the original manufacturer. Global manufacturers with high aftermarket shares have built over decades a network of official workshops, a spare parts logistics system and an operator training programme that allows them to retain the customer throughout the equipment's useful life. The medium-sized Spanish manufacturer has rarely invested in those three components with the same discipline.
The cession of aftermarket by the medium-sized manufacturer is not the result of an explicit decision. It is the accumulated consequence of several inertias. Technical service is treated as warranty cost, not as a business. Spare parts are channelled through distributors with compressed margin. Operator training is delegated to the customer or omitted. And, frequently, there is not even visibility of the active installed base beyond the first year post-sale.
The result is that independent workshops, alternative spare parts manufacturers and multi-brand service operators capture a significant fraction of the medium-sized manufacturer's aftermarket. The loss does not appear in its scorecard as loss. It appears as absence of revenue that the organisation never projected as its own.
Three specific levers become available for the medium-sized manufacturer that decides to act on this pattern. Recover visibility of the active installed base, with real usage and maintenance data per machine, not only with historical records from the moment of sale. Structure a specific commercial proposition for recurring services (scheduled maintenance, spare parts supply, training) articulated with the rigour of the new equipment proposition. And build or consolidate a proprietary network of official workshops with competitive response capability against the multi-brand network.
The frequent error consists in attempting to recover aftermarket without simultaneously addressing the three components. Improving the commercial proposition without installed base visibility does not convert. Improving the workshop network without differentiated commercial proposition does not differentiate. Improving visibility without operational network does not capture. The three components operate as a system.
Management action on this problem has three dimensions. Assign specific executive responsibility to aftermarket as a business unit, with its own budget, objectives and reporting. Build the installed base visibility system as a cross-functional project between commercial, technical service and, when applicable, telematics. And modify the commercial incentive system to reward aftermarket capture per significant account, not only new equipment sales.
The difference between the global manufacturer and the medium-sized Spanish manufacturer in construction machinery is not measured in the showroom. It is measured in the workshop, fifteen years after the first sale. And it is decided on the day the medium-sized manufacturer defines which of the two logics it wants to operate.