A recurring observation when analysing margin composition in medium-sized food manufacturers is the asymmetry between the organisational attention devoted to the retail channel and the attention devoted to the HORECA channel. The former receives the majority of commercial effort, brand investment and management committee attention. The latter operates, in many companies, as an operational appendix to the former, managed with the same structure and the same metrics. The economic difference between both channels rarely appears in internal conversation.
The HORECA channel has commercial and operational dynamics distinct from the retail channel. The interlocutor is the hotelier, the restaurateur, the collective catering manager or the HORECA specialist distributor, not the purchasing centre of a chain. Purchase frequency is higher, unit volumes smaller, price sensitivity on similar product is different. Product presentation, demanded formats and selection criteria differ. And seasonality, especially in tourist areas, conditions planning in a specific manner.
Treating HORECA as smaller retail systematically produces mediocre performance. The commercial team that operates both channels with the same methodology does not capture the specific dynamics of HORECA, which demands closer presence to the customer, greater frequency, format adaptation capability and operational knowledge of the hotelier's business. Without those capabilities, the company sells what the HORECA customer wants to buy, but loses the opportunity to sell what they could buy with adequate proposition.
The economic arithmetic of the HORECA channel is structurally favourable. Unit margin on product equivalent to retail is superior, given that the power asymmetry with the individual HORECA customer is much smaller than with large distribution. The capacity for innovation in format and presentation opens additional margin lines. Customer loyalty, when managed with discipline, substantially exceeds that of the retail shelf, where delisting is a permanent threat.
The reverse pattern is viable. Companies that have built a specific HORECA system operate with consolidated margin superior to that of equivalent manufacturers oriented only towards retail. The difference is rarely documented as competitive advantage because it is mixed with aggregate performance, but it is present in the data when disaggregated by channel.
Three components define a functional system. Commercial team dedicated to the HORECA channel, with specific methodology and metrics, not shared with the retail sales force. Catalogue and format adapted to the channel, not a retail extension with different label: presentation suited to professional use, relevant sizes, pertinent logistics conditions. And distribution network specialised in HORECA or direct relationship with significant accounts (hotel chains, restaurant groups, collective catering companies), with articulated proposition for each type of customer.
The frequent error consists of designating one or two salespeople within the retail team as responsible for HORECA, without distinct structure or methodology. The consequence is that HORECA receives residual attention, with undifferentiated proposition, and yields a fraction of the potential the channel admits with specific system.
Three concrete responsibilities translate this pattern to committee. Recognise HORECA as strategic channel with its own budget, team and metrics, distinct from the retail channel although sharing production infrastructure. Build the specific commercial proposition for the channel, with catalogue, format, conditions and service adapted to professional use. And endow the HORECA team with authority to take operational decisions (format innovation, logistics adjustment, specific conditions per account) that the retail structure does not require with the same flexibility.
The second margin engine of the medium-sized food manufacturer is rarely where organisational noise places it. It is in the channel that operates with more favourable dynamics, that receives less attention and that produces, when governed as such, a disproportionate contribution to consolidated results.